How a Scottish takeover of English law in matters of Convention rights has seen the House of Lords superseded as the final court of appeal.
Scottish criminal appeal court, to refuse their claim that the extent of their pre-trial publicity (resulting in part from a public dispute between Lord McCluskey the trial judge in the first Chhokar Singh trial and the then Lord Advocate, Lord Hardie of Blackford, over the propriety of the Crown deciding against putting all three suspects for the murder on trial together) was such as to deprive them of the possibility of a fair trial;
(ii) Hoekstra and others v Her Majesty's Advocate (No. 4) All of these appeals concerned aspects of the fair trial provision of the Convention, Article 6. The accused's appeal in Montgomery v Coulter was unsuccessful, it being held by the Judicial Committee that the High Court of Justiciary was correct in its assessment of the effect of the pre-trial publicity in this case as not being such as to prejudice the possibility of the two accused receiving a fair trial. The applicants for special leave in Hoekstra (No. 4) were also unsuccessful, with the Judicial Committee again agreeing with the High Court that the accused's applications raised no devolution issues properly so called, and that therefore there was no avenue of appeal to the Judicial Committee available under the Scotland Act 1998. By contrast, in Brown v Stott, the Crown appeal against the decision of the High Court of Justiciary was successful, it being held that any right against self-incrimination in the Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, to the effect that the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6(2) was not an absolute right but one which might properly be subject to a balancing test against the general interest of the community in suppressing crime.
The specific decisions of the Judicial Committee on the merits of each of these cases were unanimous: all are of interest and all raise important issues of law and legal interpretation, which deserve full consideration. It is particularly noteworthy that in all four of its decisions, the Judicial Committee found in favour of the narrower interpretation of Convention rights and against the arguments of each of the individual applicants. For a critical analysis of the reasoning and substantive decision 
THE DEFINITION OF A 'DEVOLUTION ISSUE'
The first thing that should be noted is that the one constant factor in all of the decisions of the Privy Council to date, acting under its Devolution jurisdiction, has been the presence of the two Scots judges in the House of Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Clyde, on the panel of judges considering these matters. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that all of these cases to date have emanated from Scotland, but it is suggested that this continuity of personnel is a factor of particular significance when coming to consider the impact of these decisions on the constitutional development of the United Kingdom, post-devolution.
In Montgomery and Coulter v Her Majesty's Advocate and the
Advocate General for Scotland, the Judicial Committee was composed in the traditional manner one now expects of Scottish appeals to the House of Lords, namely by two Scottish judges (Lord Hope and Lord Clyde) together with diree non-Scots (Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and Lord Hoffmann). However, a clear division of opinion arose among these judges as to whether or not a decision of the Lord Advocate to initiate criminal proceedings on indictment against the accused could properly be said to raise a devolution issue at all. The nonScots judges, led by Lord Hoffmann, clearly were of the view that the matter of respect for and enforcement of an individual's Article 6 rights to a fair trial was not a matter o for a prosecutor, but lay wholly with the court before which the trial was to be conducted. Accordingly, they tended to the view that one could not take the Article 6 fair trial point against the prosecutor, particularly before the trial has actually started.
The Scottish law lords by contrast, emphasised the peculiar role and history of the Lord Advocate, noting his status as 'master of the instance' in criminal trials and insisting that the approach which the Scotland Act 1998 had taken was to make the right of the accused to receive a fair In what appears to be an implicit rebuke to Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope noted that this case was the first time in which an appeal on a matter of Scots criminal law and procedure had ever come before a court situated outside Scotland; he therefore stressed the need for all the judges of that court to think themselves into the history and modes of understanding of Scots criminal lawyers, rather than simply for the judges to assume that the Scottish criminal system mirrored English criminal and the Lnglish-derived criminal legal systems.
The matter at stake was clearly one of the highest general In the event, since all the judges in Montgomery and Coulter were agreed that the appeal should be dismissed on the basis that the facts did not show any potential breach of the accused's fair trial rights, the non-Scots judges did not find it was not necessary for them to reach any final decision to be reached on the point as to whether a devolution issue had properly been raised as regards the applicability of Article 6 to the acts and omissions of the Lord Advocate, leaving the point to be argued and resolved on another occasion.
In Hoekstra (No. 4) the three-judge screening committee has itself been placed at level lower in the judicial hierarchy by another court, the Judicial Committee, which a developing constitutional convention seems to indicate will be a court composed substantially, (and at times by a majority) of Scots lawyers deciding cases brought primarily from Scotland. they have applied for and been given leave to intervene to argue their case before the House of Lords in Alconbury and thereby have afforded themselves two bites of the cherry, once before the House of Lord and once before the Privy Council a privilege not afforded to County Properties Ltd. who brought the original judicial review application which sparked off the whole argument as to the reach of Article 6 in planning matters.
One cannot but feel that this kind of ad hoc constitutional structure will not prove to be an inherently stable one, particularly given that there are at least stateable arguments (which might be raised should, for example, the Privy Council decision in Brown v Stott be taken by the accused to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, or if County Properties Ltd. are themselves ultimately unsuccessful before the Privy Council and decide to take the matter further) to the effect that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council does not itself conform to the requirements of the Convention, in particular Article 6(1), as regards having the appearance of being 'an independent and impartial tribunal established by law'. On the requirements for an tribunal to have the appearance of independence and impartiality see the decision of the Scottish Criminal appeal court in Starrs and another v Ruxton (Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow) Ultimately, it is suggested, the logic of the on-going constitutional change will require the setting up a properly established constitutional court for the United Kingdom, with properly identified, tenured and explicitly independent judges, perhaps appointed after parliamentary hearings along the lines of the US Supreme Court. The genie of constitutional reform is out of the bottle and has acquired its own dynamic. It would appear we have not completed the task of writing the constitution.
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